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1. Introduction
We consider an economic model for a communication network with utility-maximizing elastic users
who adapt to congestion by adjusting their ows. Users are heterogeneous with respect to both
the utility they attach to dierent levels of ow and their sensitivity to delay or other measures of
congestion. Following Kelly at al [4], we introduce dynamical rate-control algorithms, based on the
users' utility functions and delay sensitivities, as well as tolls charged by the system, and examine
their behavior. We show that allowing heterogeneity with respect to delay sensitivity introduces
a fundamental non-convexity into the congestion-cost functions. As a result, there are typically
multiple stationary points. Hence marginal-cost pricing { equating users' marginal utilities to their
marginal costs { may identify a local maximum or even a saddle point, rather than a global maximum.
We present a simple example in which the only interior stationary point is a saddlepoint, which is
dominated by all the single-user optimal allocations. Thus, heterogeneity of users can lead to class
dominance: a situation in which the system is dominated by a single user or class of users under
an optimal ow allocation. The dynamical-system rate-control algorithm may converge to a local
rather than global maximum, depending on the starting point.
2. Summary of Results
We consider a variant of an economic model proposed by Kelly [3] and elaborated by Kelly et
al [4] for a communication network with utility-maximizing elastic users who adapt to congestion
by adjusting their ows. A distinctive feature of our model is that users not only dier with respect
to the utility they attach to dierent levels of ow, but are heterogeneous in their sensitivity to
congestion. Following Kelly at al [4], we introduce dynamical rate-control algorithms, based on the
users' utility functions and delay sensitivities, as well as tolls charged by the system, and examine
their behavior.
We show that allowing heterogeneity among users dramatically alters the economic properties of the
system and the performance of the algorithms. In particular, heterogeneity introduces a fundamental
non-convexity into the congestion-cost functions. As a result, there are typically multiple stationary
points, that is, ow allocations that satisfy the usual rst-order conditions for optimality. Hence
the principles of marginal-cost pricing must be applied with care. Put another way, simply equating
users' marginal utilities to their marginal costs may identify a local maximum or even a saddle
point, rather than a global maximum. Indeed, we present a simple example in which the only interior
stationary point is a saddlepoint, which is dominated by all the single-user optimal allocations. Thus,
heterogeneity of users can lead to class dominance: a situation in which the system is dominated by
a single user or class of users under an optimal ow allocation (see Balachandran and Schaefer [2],
Balachandran and Radhakrishnan [1], Ma and Rump [6]).
We also study the convergence properties of a dynamical rate-control algorithm in which each user is
charged a dynamically varying toll by each resource (link) on that user's route. Standard economic
theory dictates that the toll should be set equal to the external eect at the resource. We show that
when this is done the algorithm always converges to a local maximum and never to a saddlepoint, but
which local maximum is approached depends on the starting point of the algorithm. In the example
referred to above, this means that class-dominant solutions are the only possible limit points of
the algorithm. Class-dominant solutions fail (dramatically) to satisfy basic fairness criteria such as
max-min fairness or proportional fairness, which have been proposed in the literature (see Kelly [3],
[5] for a discussion of fairness concepts). Thus, in the case of heterogeneous users there may be a
fundamental incompatibility between fairness and net utility maximization.
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